In the aftermath of several prominent mass public shootings, a heated debate over gun control has arisen, and several restrictive policies have been proposed to limit gun ownership. The debate inevitably eventually lands on the nature of the Second Amendment's provision that the "right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed." Some voices, particularly political liberals, contend that the presence of the phrase "a well regulated militia being necessary for the security of a free state" is a limitation on those people who possess the "right of keep and bear arms" mentioned immediately after. Surprisingly, this argument is quite common, and is generally the first objection raised when the right to keep and bear arms is mentioned. It does not, however, stand up to scrutiny.
First, one should consider the context of the sentence itself. Here the bane of English students everywhere - diagramming - becomes a useful tool. By diagramming the sentence it is possible to determine what relationship the two parts of the amendment have to each other. The diagram below does so.
With this in mind, the amendment can be interpreted more clearly. To paraphrase, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed, because - remember that the nominative absolute exists to explain the rest of the sentence - a well-regulated militia is necessary for the security of a free state. When arranged in this manner it couldn't be more clear that the amendment refers to an individual right for all the people to bear arms (it should also be noted that "infringed" includes any form of limiting, so anything that limits the right to keep and bear arms in any way violates the Second Amendment).
The reader may remain unconvinced. If so, there is a way to test this interpretation. If this interpretation is correct, then the "militia" in question would refer to "the people" as a whole, and we would expect this fact to be reflected in what the authors of the Constitution had to say on the matter. As it happens, they had a great deal to say on the topic. First, think about what Patrick Henry - who, I'm sure, needs no introduction here - had to say:
“The great object is that every man be armed. Everyone who is able might have a gun.”Consider also this quote from Richard Henry Lee, a member of the Continental Congress and signatory of the Declaration of Independence and the Articles of Confederation.
"A militia, when properly formed, are in fact the people themselves...and include all men capable of bearing arms."Lee apparently believed that the militia consisted of the entirety of the populace. If a clearer statement is desired, George Mason, the "Father of the Bill of Rights" was happy to oblige.
"I ask, sir, what is the militia? It is the whole people, except for a few public officials."Tench Coxe, a Pennsylvania delegate to the Continental Congress gave his own description of what the militia was.
“Who are the militia? Are they not ourselves?"Finally, James Madison, who drafted most of the Constitution, was also very clear about the correct nature of the militia.
"The right of the people to keep and bear...arms shall not be infringed. A well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, trained to arms, is the best and most natural defense of a free country..."It seems abundantly obvious from the above quotes that the above interpretation of the Second Amendment - that is, that the reference to a militia is an explanation of why the people have the right to bear arms, not a limitation on the right to bear arms - is the correct one. The fact that a well-regulated (well-trained and equipped - note the similarity to the term "regular army," which referred to a professional, well-equipped army) militia is necessary is the reason that the people's right to keep and bear arms should not be infringed.
Therefore, the objection that the right to keep and bear arms is offered only to a select few militiamen is flatly contradicted by both historical and grammatical context. Further, the Second Amendment denies the government the ability to take any action to infringe on - in other words, to limit - the right to keep and bear arms. For this reason, unless the Constitution is discarded or amended, any action to limit the availability of firearms - gun control, as it is known today - is entirely unconstitutional. Few people sum the matter up better than Tench Coxe:
Finally, Patrick Henry, an early skeptic of the Constitution because he believed it did not provide enough protection for state and individual rights, covers the right to bear arms as a whole in his usual fiery style.
“Congress have no power to disarm the militia. Their swords, and every other terrible implement of the soldier, are the birth-right of an American… [T]he unlimited power of the sword is not in the hands of either the federal or state governments, but, where I trust in God it will ever remain, in the hands of the people.”
“Are we at last brought to such a humiliating and debasing degradation, that we cannot be trusted with arms for our own defense? Where is the difference between having our arms in our possession and under our own direction, and having them under the management of Congress? If our defense be the real object of having those arms, in whose hands can they be trusted with more propriety, or equal safety to us, as in our own hands?
The right to keep and bear arms is the right of the people. They have yielded it, in part (and unwisely), to both federal and state governments in order to create a standing army, however, the fact that the federal and state governments have such a right is no reason to infringe on the peoples' right to do the same. Any attempt to do so is both dangerous and unconstitutional, and should not be tolerated.
Since the beginning of recorded history man has been fascinated by the exploration of his surroundings. From the simplest inquiries into his immediate surroundings to the complicated and fanciful speculations which have been produced to explain more complex phenomena, we are the heirs of a long history of attempts to understand. Eventually a continuous thread began to emerge, the embryonic stages of a new way of looking at the world. Beginning in Greece and growing in western Europe, these new dreamers began exploring the world using deduction and observation. The basis for scientific inquiry that they established has provided the launching board for a host of advances. The view that science alone provides access to truth has become increasingly prevalent. This view, however, is flawed. Science deals in probabilities, not certainties, and it has its limits. Beyond those limits other means of determining truth not only can but have achieved the certainty which escapes the grasp of the scientist.
To many the very idea that this might be the case is frightening and disturbing. In large part this is because of a misunderstanding, particularly in modern western culture, of the nature of knowledge. Because of its tremendous ability to reveal truth about the natural world, science, and mathematics, the language of science, has come to be considered to be the only means of finding truth. This is not entirely unwarranted - it would be difficult to imagine a better tool for understanding the natural world than science - but it is simplistic. Science is a construct created by humans in recognition both of the nature of the universe we inhabit and of our own failings. It derives its power from its ability to accommodate human inabilities, but those failings are also its Achilles heel. It exists in the present, physical world, like us, and it is limited to achieving near-certainty - absolute truth is entirely beyond the province of science. When science is confronted with areas outside its empire those who rely solely on science are left teetering on the edge of a chasm of unknowns. A certain amount of distress is to be expected. Mathematicians attempted to lead the way across the abyss and establish a rational system of absolute truth, but, without going into too much painful detail, the work of Kurt Gödel effectively demolished that precarious scaffold by establishing that true statements can exist which it is impossible to prove using axiomatic reasoning - in other words, mathematics proved that it cannot prove. The boundaries of the axiomatic-deductive system, which provides the basis for all of science, although still foggy, clearly exist and cannot be breached.
This, however, should come as no surprise, whether one is religious or not. After all, there is no particular reason why rational inquiry should be able to probe anything real. Why shouldn't the world be chaotic? Einstein described the fact that our senses correspond to reality as a "miracle." He attributed it, as any good positivist must, to some unknown force which transcends our perception of reality. His description is the simplest which is logically defensible. Some force, incomprehensible through our reason, must have designed and maintain the universe to be comprehensible to our minds. In fact, this is the greatest contribution science can make toward understanding the impenetrable fog before it. It cannot cross the boundaries of its empire, but it can probe them. It can only bring us to the end of the finite, but because of the very fact that it can do so it leaves no doubt that the infinite must exist, even if it is just out of sight beyond the corner.
This, however, should come as no surprise, whether one is religious or not. After all, there is no particular reason why rational inquiry should be able to probe anything real. Why shouldn't the world be chaotic? Einstein described the fact that our senses correspond to reality as a "miracle." He attributed it, as any good positivist must, to some unknown force which transcends our perception of reality. His description is the simplest which is logically defensible. Some force, incomprehensible through our reason, must have designed and maintain the universe to be comprehensible to our minds. In fact, this is the greatest contribution science can make toward understanding the impenetrable fog before it. It cannot cross the boundaries of its empire, but it can probe them. It can only bring us to the end of the finite, but because of the very fact that it can do so it leaves no doubt that the infinite must exist, even if it is just out of sight beyond the corner.
Once the existence of the infinite is established it remains only to determine its nature. Here we have taken leave entirely from the axiomatic-deductive method, and in ourselves would be completely lost. Finite creatures cannot hope to comprehend the actions of the infinite, let alone the smallest particle of the infinite itself. We are lost completely, completely unable to begin to understand what it is that we cannot know. We have as much chance of reaching our goal as a man sinking in quicksand has of saving himself by pulling on his shoestrings. Insofar as finding absolute truth is concerned, we are helpless.
And we would remain helpless, too, but for one fact: the Infinite is not a thing or a impersonal force, it is a Being with a desire to know us, and for us to know Him. He was not content to leave us flailing in the dark, instead reaching down into our finite existence to communicate His infinity to us. Through this revelation and through His direct communion with us we have the ability to begin to know the nature of the truly Infinite. Again, the axiomatic-deductive approach can be useful, but only in probing the edges. The true working of the infinite transcends our understanding. It would be pointless to attempt to grasp it all, just as it would be pointless for child who enjoyed the ocean to try to bring it home. We cannot grasp it all - it is not all ours - but we can grasp enough. We will never know all of the nature of the Infinite, since we are not infinite ourselves, but we can join the blind man of John 9:25 in saying "One thing I know: that though I was blind, now I see.”
Therein lies the wonder and beauty of it: through God's revelation to us we can achieve greater certainty than we can through all of science. Science is our way of adapting our means of finding knowledge to our fallen condition, but it cannot rival the direct revelation of the One is infinite and perfect. Through Him we are truly imbued with, in the words of Michael Faraday, "no doubtful hope." This is not a guess or an arbitrary statement about an area in which we have no knowledge, it is the only possible conclusion which can be reached once one has reached the end of reason's ability to comprehend and experienced the revelation of God to man. To again quote Faraday:
"Speculations, man, I have none. I have certainties. I thank God that I don't rest my dying head upon speculations for "I know whom I have believed and am persuaded that he is able to keep that which I've committed unto him against that day."
When we have gone as far as reason can take us we are still lost, but God in His mercy did not leave us with reason alone. He revealed Himself to us, and finding that we had sullied His creation and were lost and fallen, He died for us so that He could have communion with those who come to Him in repentance and faith. For this reason it is possible to know beyond any shadow of a doubt - and I do - that there is a God and that He loves us.
It has been said, so many times, in fact, that it has become almost cliché, that ideas have consequences or, to put it another way, that wrong thought leads to wrong action. In many cases an incorrect line of reasoning immediately leads to obviously incorrect action, however, in some instances an error can go relatively unnoticed, either because the one holding to the idea puts it into practice only erratically or because the belief, although incorrect, produces a correct result in most cases. These errors are, in fact, the most dangerous, since they are rarely seen yet can still lead to incorrect actions.
One particular such error lies in the common thought the Christians ought to do the right thing because doing so creates good results. It would seem to be apparently logical to base one's judgment of what the right action is on whether or not the results it produces are desirable. Some may already recognize the insidious error found in this line of reasoning, but it is certainly not readily apparent to most people. The fact is, the statement that a Christian should base his judgment of an action on the results the action produces is the farthest thing from the truth. One could hardly conceive of a more dangerous error for a Christian to hold to. It usually causes the one holding it to arrive at the correct course of action – God's ways are indeed good ways, so in most cases the right action will produce a desirable outcome – but it is most emphatically not a sound basis for any Christian to take action.
In fact, this “results-based” morality is the product of a secular humanist philosophy, not Christianity. Given no other standard to judge behavior humanist philosophers have devised a number of devices for judging the ethics of an action, all of them based on the results an action achieves. For example, one of the more well-known examples of a non-Christian code of ethics, utilitarianism, argues that the individual should seek to do the greatest possible good for the greatest possible number of people. In other words, the individual should seek the best possible result, where the goodness or badness of the result is defined based on the net “good” (which can only be defined as pleasure without some other standard to define good) the action produces. Other codes of ethics may define what result is desirable differently, but the basic principle is the same: we take action in order to achieve a desirable result and for no other reason.
The discussion in the above paragraph should begin to give the reader an idea of at least one of the salient flaws of results-based morality. By basing its judgment of the rightness or wrongness of an action on the results achieved, it ignores the fact that the full results of an action cannot be entirely known even after the action has been taken. Christianity, which assumes absolute right and wrong, at the very least strongly suggests that it is possible to know whether an action is right or wrong before the action is taken, and certainly, failing that, afterward. However, if we base our determination of right and wrong on the results of the action we must inevitably conclude that it is impossible to know whether an action is right or wrong before the action is made, and only possible to guess afterward. This fact alone should strongly suggest that Christianity and results-based morality are incompatible.
If this was not enough, results-based morality also misplaces the burden of responsibility for effecting change in the world. Any Christian should recognize that not only does predicting and effecting positive change in the future exceed our ability, it exceeds our responsibility as well. God is more than capable of achieving any results he desires, whatever our action, while our inability to predict future results inevitably requires an inability to consistently achieve our desired results. We are like children, assigned a task by our elder, not because he requires our assistance for the task but out of kindness towards us. Our “goodness” is therefore not judged by the success of our bumbling, amateurish actions – had that been the point the adult could have done it himself far better – but by the fact that we tried to follow the directions given to us. Similarly, we take action not to align world events with God's will – he is more than capable of doing that without our aid – but to align ourselves with God's will. What happens is incidental to the single most important point of any action: how closely it conforms with God's standard of holiness.
With this in mind Christians must emphatically reject attempts to judge the morality of an action based on subjective determinations of whether the result achieved was “good” or “bad.” Such a determination assumes more responsibility and more ability than humans have or were ever intended to have. Instead, we must embrace the belief that the morality of every action is decided solely by how closely that action conforms with God's standard. In many cases actions that conform to God's standard will produce what we view as “good” results, but that is never why an action is right, merely a sign that it may be. Accepting a correct view of morality requires not only that Christians understand such a correct view of morality, but also that they apply it. We must check ourselves when we find ourselves explaining that we are taking an action because it results in certain desirable things and instead teach ourselves to link each action to specific Biblical principles that support it. By doing otherwise we risk allowing an apparently trivial yet still dangerous error to compromise our modes of thinking and acting, potentially causing us to take wrong action, something that should be anathema to the careful Christian.
Nuclear power today is defined by the antiquated needs of, of all things, submarines. During the development of the USS Nautilus, the first nuclear submarine, it became apparent that a solid uranium-fueled reactor would not only provide certain benefits when used in a submarine, it could also produce weaponizable byproducts, and, perhaps most important, could be ready sooner than its many competitors. Admiral Hyman Rickover decided in favor of a water cooled solid reactor fueled by uranium oxide enriched in U-235., and in doing so decided the future of nuclear power.
To modern eyes Rickover's choice seems inexplicable. Up until his decision thorium appeared to be the future of nuclear power, however, once the water cooled solid uranium reactor was supported by the deep pockets of Uncle Sam, the contest was essentially over. Thorium, although promising, required development and could not compete with uranium. Although the reasons behind Rickover's choice are no longer relevant, uranium has maintained its ascendancy due to the massive costs associated with building and operating a nuclear reactor.
The advantages of a thorium-fueled reactor seem almost too good to be true. Thorium is approximately four times as abundant as uranium, a much higher percentage of the energy inherent in that supply can be extracted, and it is often found in conjunction with, and can easily be separated from, the vitally important rare earth elements, making it an attractive long-term option. In an age when the dangers of nuclear proliferation are glaringly obvious, one feature of thorium which to Admiral Rickover was a negative, has become one of its most highly touted selling points: a liquid fluoride thorium reactor (LFTR) of the sort proposed by most of the thorium lobby does not produce weaponizable byproducts (Hargraves and Moir 2010). An LFTR produces energy, freshwater, and a very small amount of low-grade waste. Due to this fact it could be installed in places a conventional uranium reactor could not, removing the opportunity for endless foreign policy debates about whether a particular partially unhinged petty dictator is pursuing nuclear power for peaceful or military reasons.
Thorium's case is further advanced by the nature and amount of the waste produced. An LFTR produces less than 10% of the waste a conventional reactor does, and waste from an LFTR has less than 1% of the radiotoxicity of waste from a conventional nuclear reactor. Further, that waste, rather than taking on the order of ten thousand years to become safe, it requires closer to one hundred years to become safe. These advantages are due to the fact that most of the waste produced by an LFTR is reused in the reactor, leaving only a small, relatively innocuous portion to be disposed of.
Once an LFTR has been built, thorium can also be more than competitive economically. At present electricity in the United States costs between $0.05 and $0.06 per kWh and the potential “clean” energy sources—wind and solar—cost between $0.20 and $0.30 per kWh. In contrast, an LFTR has the potential to produce power at a cost as low as $0.03 per kWh (Hargraves and Moir 2010). The difference per kWh is small, but when one considers that, given that the average home consumes around 10,000 kWh per year, an LFTR could mean the difference between an annual electric bill of $50,000 or $60,000 at current rates and a bill of only $30,000 it suddenly becomes much more meaningful.
In light of the devastating effects of mismanaged nuclear power at Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, and, more recently, Fukushima, few care about the logistics and viability of a power source if it also carries the potential to irradiate the surrounding countryside. Here thorium continues to shine. A conventional reactor is cooled by pressurized water, creating the potential for a catastrophic leak. Further, when the temperature in a conventional reactor rises the fuel expands, which accelerates the reaction, which heats the reactor, which in turn causes the fuel to expand. A conventional reactor aslo requires active cooling, meaning that if power is shut down such that cooling can no longer take place, as occurred at Fukushima, the reaction will continue to accelerate until the reactor melts down. An LFTR is cooled molten fluoride salt which is not under pressure, removing the single most dangerous feature of conventional reactors. Additionally, an LFTR will simply shut down if power is removed—unlike a conventional reactor, it does not require power to shut down but to stay running (Hargraves and Moir 2010; Shiga 2011). The LFTR thus presents an extremely attractive option as far as safety is concerned.
Thorium presents an economical, safe, effective, and “clean” energy source. It can compete with and beat coal and oil in cost. It can be used in areas too unstable to sustain conventional nuclear and too poor or incompetent to use other conventional fuel sources. It's waste products are not abundant and are relatively innocuous. Although mining and transportation may be accompanied by some pollutant emissions, the reactor itself is not. Why, then, is thorium still an unknown cousin of uranium? The answer, as one might expect, is money and government. A prototype thorium reactor would cost on the order of $1 billion dollars; a commercial model closer to $5 to $10 billion. Very few people are willing to spend that kind of money on a project which is, whatever its potential, still unproven. Further, any investment of that magnitude would have yield a significant return within a reasonable amount of time. At best, it would take 10 years for an investor to being to see returns on the investment and, crucially, the extent and even the existence of those returns hinges on an uncertain regulatory environment. In countries where the government has demonstrated that it is willing to support investment in thorium research projects to build thorium-fueled reactors have moved ahead. In countries where the government has not shown such resolve thorium research has stalled or has never begun. In any case, it is hard to believe that the obvious benefits of thorium will remain hidden for long: it seems far more likely that in thorium we can see what will one day be unequivocally the fuel of the future.
References:
Hargraves, Robert, and Ralph Moir. 2010. "Liquid Fluoride Thorium Reactors." American Scientist 98, no.
4: 304-313.
Shiga, David. 2011. "Rescuing Nuclear Power." New Scientist 209, no. 2805: 8-10.
The
world has no shortage of well-intentioned individuals who loudly
condemn what they view as the intolerance of religion, decrying and
renouncing all forms of religion. However, in their refusal to
tolerate intolerance they themselves engage in intolerance. These
eidolons of universal tolerance insist on tolerance for some things
and intolerance for others. Although these crusaders are loath to
admit it, just as those they condemn choose which actions will be
tolerated and which will not, they must choose which intolerance is
condemned and which is not. This in itself is not a problem—every one
of us every day makes decisions about what is right and what is
wrong, and none of us give it a second thought.
A
difficult problem arises, however, when one examines the basis of
this refusal to tolerate certain forms of intolerance. On the
surface, these crusaders will boldly proclaim “right” and
“wrong,” citing examples and lauding the former while condemning
the later. When pressed. the definitions become much less clear.
Prominent atheist and Harvard Law professor (although in the modern
era one could argue that the two descriptors are synonymous) Alan
Dershowitz admitted that he didn't know what was right. He claimed to
be able to discern wrong, but what basis he could use for his
discernment is unclear. It is likely that his basis for determining
wrong is the same as that for determining right among those divorced
from ultimate reality, that is, no basis but the preference of the
individual. In reality, the issue is a matter of preference on the
part of the speaker. One must choose which forms of intolerance to
refuse to tolerate—after all, the decision not to tolerate anything
is intolerant by its nature—and that decision, in the absence of
the teachings of intolerant religion, must be based on the whims of
the one making the decision, not on eternal principles. A decision
made on such a basis has no authority for anyone but the one making
it—it should have no more weight for listeners than a statement
about the speakers preference in food, movies, or interior
decorating. At a societal level, as these principles are being
applied, right and wrong are thus determined by many personal
preferences taken as an aggregate—in short, majority vote. No one
in his right mind, after viewing the catalog of past horrendous
actions that seemed right to the majority at the time but now seem so
glaringly wrong, could argue that this is any basis for morality.
Without
a basis for morality besides “I like it” or “I don't like it”
(whatever rubric one uses, whether Kantianism, Utilitarianism, or any
other ethical standard based in human reason, it is, at its heart,
only preference) what is left for establishing a code of conduct for
society is nothing but the simplistic “because I say so” from the
majority. What is so thoroughly despised in our parents some would
have us accept as the sole basis for laws and government. This
philosophy cannot allow any rights outside of those recognized by the
preference of the majority. If there is no higher authority than will
of the majority in a very real sense rights are granted, not by the
creator or another higher authority who society ought to recognize,
but by society itself. One could argue, then, that in the 1850's a
black man, as Chief Justice Taney stated, had no rights that society
was bound to respect because society did not choose to grant those
rights to him. Similarly, a Jew in Nazi Germany would not have any
rights other than those granted by society around him—and society,
as was so tragically demonstrated, chose to grant very, very few.
Today society in the United States grants no rights to the unborn,
and one can only imagine which group will be next.
A
society cannot exist with this as its standard for law and
government. Those who advocate for refusing to tolerate what they
define as intolerance in reality enforce a form of intellectual
tyranny just as oppressive within its sphere as any concocted by
history's infamous tyrants and dictators. Indeed, because this
standard of right and wrong is based in nothing more than the whim of
the individual yet held with as much adamant fervor as any religious
belief it establishes a precedent that could be used for horrendous
oppression. In the name of tolerance they have assaulted the
foundations of freedom in America. By establishing the idea that
rights are based not on changeless principles but on the whim of
society, and by beating those who step outside of the rights society
chooses to grant back into line, they instead lay a foundation for
future tyranny.
1973 brought a lot of things to America. That year we pulled out of Vietnam, leaving our South Vietnamese allies to face the Russian-backed North alone. Richard Nixon assured the country that he was not a crook. The World Trade Center became the tallest building in the world. The nerdier among us may mark it as the year Skylab, our first space station, was launched. Nothing that happened that year, however, had a greater impact than the Supreme Court's ruling in Roe v. Wade on January 22 that abortion was a constitutionally protected right. With that ruling state laws across the country banning abortion were struck down, fundamentally changing the nation.
The Supreme Court's decision wasn't the first salvo on the topic of abortion. Efforts to relax state laws prohibiting abortion to include exceptions for rape, incest, the life of the mother, and other extreme cases through legislative means had been going on for years. No one, though, had argued that abortion was a constitutionally protected right. Justice Blackmun, together with his liberal colleagues, argued that a right to privacy existed in the Constitution, based either in the fourteenth or the ninth amendment, and that that right to privacy justified aborting unborn children up until the child would be viable if delivered. The decision led to more than fifty-two million abortions in the subsequent years—for comparison, total American deaths in World War II only come out to about one million.
The decision in Roe v. Wade is troubling for a number of issues, some of them not even related to abortion. First, the court found a right to privacy in the Constitution not recognized by any scholar of that document. Certainly the Supreme Court, beginning in 1923, had actively reinterpreted the Constitution to extend the right to liberty found in the fourteenth amendment into a general right to privacy, but the 1973 decision expanded that effort massively. Chief Justice Douglas in Griswold v. Connecticut had found a right to privacy in the “emanations” and “penumbras” of other rights actually found in the Constitution. The district court that ruled in Roe v. Wade prior to the Supreme Court found that the right to privacy was derived from the ninth amendment. Justice Blackmun, in writing his opinion in Roe v. Wade expanded that right to privacy drastically and gave it a home in the fourteenth amendment.
Each possible source of a constitutional right to privacy, however, lacks substance. The argument from “emanations” and “penumbras” is a fairly obvious attempt to read something into the Constitution the founders' did not intend. The argument from the ninth amendment is also badly off the mark. The Constitution is a limit on national, not state, government. The fact that the Constitution does not “deny or disparage” rights not specifically protected does not in any way mean that the states cannot do so. If one were to make the argument that the ninth amendment limits the states no state could pass any law that limits the rights of any individual in any way, since all rights would be protected by the ninth amendment. This is obviously absurd. The argument from the fourteenth amendment is also flawed. Although the fourteenth amendment guarantees that no state can deprive any citizen of “life, liberty, or property without due process of law,” the wording clearly intends “life, liberty, or property” to mean the three forms of punishment possible: death, imprisonment, or fine. Once again, by making the argument that liberty is intended to apply to all forms of liberty one reaches an entirely untenable conclusion.
A greater flaw in the decision's reasoning lies in the age when the unborn child begins to be partially protected. According to the decision states cannot limit abortion in any way except to protect the life of the mother until the baby would be viable if delivered. The obvious implication is that life begins at viability. This lacks even basic common sense. While the decision, based on the ability of the medical community at that time, placed the line when viability began at twenty-eight weeks today fifty to seventy percent of babies born at twenty-four weeks survive. Even at twenty-three weeks thirty-five percent survive. Basing one's definition of what life should be protected on the viability of the child outside the womb thus places life entirely at the hands of technology. Fifty years ago keeping a child born at twenty-three weeks gestation alive would have been unimaginable. Today, although difficult, it is possible. One can imagine that similar advances will occur in the next fifty years, meaning that children who, according to Roe v. Wade, could not be protected by state law now would present little problem to the medical professionals of that time. To emphasis the absurdity of viability as a measure of the beginning of protected life a thought experiment could be useful. Imagine that a device capable of maintaining fetal viability beginning at fifteen weeks gestation was invented. The inventor, being a particularly greedy fellow, refused to reveal the plans or how the complex machine could be used before he was paid. Without a demonstration no company would pay for the eccentric genius's machine, so he died without revealing the secret of his invention. Now, are the unborn children at fifteen, sixteen, seventeen, etc. weeks gestation alive in such a way that they should be protected? Should they be allowed to be protected by state law? After all, the equipment does exist to keep them alive outside the womb. On the other hand, no one is capable of actually using the equipment, so perhaps they shouldn't be protected. One could go on and imagine any number of situations in which fetal viability would be completely inadequate to mark the beginning of life.
This example, along with other objections to fetal viability as a measure of the beginning of protected life, merely highlights the problem: fetal viability has absolutely no relation to life. Arguing that an unborn child is not alive because it would not be viable outside the womb is exactly equivalent to arguing that you are not alive because you would not be viable if a maniac slammed an icepick through your head. One's future or potential state cannot, by definition, affect one's present state.
A simple rule of thumb is that if something is not considered to be characteristic of human life in adult humans it should not be considered to be the single mark of life in the unborn. That means that, since future and potential viability are not considered to be marks of humanity in the population at large, they should not be considered such in the unborn. Further, no one seriously believes that the ability to feel pain, cognizance, appearance, or the size of one's brain or other organs marks human life in the population at large, so it should not be the mark of life in the unborn. In reality, the one physical trait that is universally considered to mark a human being is the presence of a unique set of DNA. One cannot point to any other stage in the development of an unborn human when anything intrinsic to the nature of the child changes dramatically enough to warrant being considered to be the beginning of life.
Given that life logically must begin at conception, when all the information necessary for life is present, society, through government, has not only the right but also the duty to protect that right. First and foremost among government's tasks is the duty to protect life and implicit in that duty is the necessity of first defining life by the best means possible. Thus abortion is not, as many would have us believe, a private, personal choice beyond the reach of government intervention, it is, as we have seen, an attack on the most defenseless among us and as such is well within the purview of government. Even liberal Justice Blackmun admitted that if the unborn baby was a person it would “of course” be protected by the fourteenth amendment. This means that the unborn are protected by the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws, and Congress is authorized to pass appropriate legislation to enforce that protection. It is past high time that Congress and the American people shake off the Supreme Court's deadly foolishness by taking appropriate action to protect the rights of every person within the United States, born or unborn.
The decision in Roe v. Wade is troubling for a number of issues, some of them not even related to abortion. First, the court found a right to privacy in the Constitution not recognized by any scholar of that document. Certainly the Supreme Court, beginning in 1923, had actively reinterpreted the Constitution to extend the right to liberty found in the fourteenth amendment into a general right to privacy, but the 1973 decision expanded that effort massively. Chief Justice Douglas in Griswold v. Connecticut had found a right to privacy in the “emanations” and “penumbras” of other rights actually found in the Constitution. The district court that ruled in Roe v. Wade prior to the Supreme Court found that the right to privacy was derived from the ninth amendment. Justice Blackmun, in writing his opinion in Roe v. Wade expanded that right to privacy drastically and gave it a home in the fourteenth amendment.
Each possible source of a constitutional right to privacy, however, lacks substance. The argument from “emanations” and “penumbras” is a fairly obvious attempt to read something into the Constitution the founders' did not intend. The argument from the ninth amendment is also badly off the mark. The Constitution is a limit on national, not state, government. The fact that the Constitution does not “deny or disparage” rights not specifically protected does not in any way mean that the states cannot do so. If one were to make the argument that the ninth amendment limits the states no state could pass any law that limits the rights of any individual in any way, since all rights would be protected by the ninth amendment. This is obviously absurd. The argument from the fourteenth amendment is also flawed. Although the fourteenth amendment guarantees that no state can deprive any citizen of “life, liberty, or property without due process of law,” the wording clearly intends “life, liberty, or property” to mean the three forms of punishment possible: death, imprisonment, or fine. Once again, by making the argument that liberty is intended to apply to all forms of liberty one reaches an entirely untenable conclusion.
A greater flaw in the decision's reasoning lies in the age when the unborn child begins to be partially protected. According to the decision states cannot limit abortion in any way except to protect the life of the mother until the baby would be viable if delivered. The obvious implication is that life begins at viability. This lacks even basic common sense. While the decision, based on the ability of the medical community at that time, placed the line when viability began at twenty-eight weeks today fifty to seventy percent of babies born at twenty-four weeks survive. Even at twenty-three weeks thirty-five percent survive. Basing one's definition of what life should be protected on the viability of the child outside the womb thus places life entirely at the hands of technology. Fifty years ago keeping a child born at twenty-three weeks gestation alive would have been unimaginable. Today, although difficult, it is possible. One can imagine that similar advances will occur in the next fifty years, meaning that children who, according to Roe v. Wade, could not be protected by state law now would present little problem to the medical professionals of that time. To emphasis the absurdity of viability as a measure of the beginning of protected life a thought experiment could be useful. Imagine that a device capable of maintaining fetal viability beginning at fifteen weeks gestation was invented. The inventor, being a particularly greedy fellow, refused to reveal the plans or how the complex machine could be used before he was paid. Without a demonstration no company would pay for the eccentric genius's machine, so he died without revealing the secret of his invention. Now, are the unborn children at fifteen, sixteen, seventeen, etc. weeks gestation alive in such a way that they should be protected? Should they be allowed to be protected by state law? After all, the equipment does exist to keep them alive outside the womb. On the other hand, no one is capable of actually using the equipment, so perhaps they shouldn't be protected. One could go on and imagine any number of situations in which fetal viability would be completely inadequate to mark the beginning of life.
This example, along with other objections to fetal viability as a measure of the beginning of protected life, merely highlights the problem: fetal viability has absolutely no relation to life. Arguing that an unborn child is not alive because it would not be viable outside the womb is exactly equivalent to arguing that you are not alive because you would not be viable if a maniac slammed an icepick through your head. One's future or potential state cannot, by definition, affect one's present state.
A simple rule of thumb is that if something is not considered to be characteristic of human life in adult humans it should not be considered to be the single mark of life in the unborn. That means that, since future and potential viability are not considered to be marks of humanity in the population at large, they should not be considered such in the unborn. Further, no one seriously believes that the ability to feel pain, cognizance, appearance, or the size of one's brain or other organs marks human life in the population at large, so it should not be the mark of life in the unborn. In reality, the one physical trait that is universally considered to mark a human being is the presence of a unique set of DNA. One cannot point to any other stage in the development of an unborn human when anything intrinsic to the nature of the child changes dramatically enough to warrant being considered to be the beginning of life.
Given that life logically must begin at conception, when all the information necessary for life is present, society, through government, has not only the right but also the duty to protect that right. First and foremost among government's tasks is the duty to protect life and implicit in that duty is the necessity of first defining life by the best means possible. Thus abortion is not, as many would have us believe, a private, personal choice beyond the reach of government intervention, it is, as we have seen, an attack on the most defenseless among us and as such is well within the purview of government. Even liberal Justice Blackmun admitted that if the unborn baby was a person it would “of course” be protected by the fourteenth amendment. This means that the unborn are protected by the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws, and Congress is authorized to pass appropriate legislation to enforce that protection. It is past high time that Congress and the American people shake off the Supreme Court's deadly foolishness by taking appropriate action to protect the rights of every person within the United States, born or unborn.
In the wake of the high profile shootings this year in Colorado, Oregon, and Connecticut several prominent public figures, notably New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg, have claimed that stricter gun control could have solved the problem. These avid supporters of further government regulation of firearms argue that the provisions of the second amendment should be set aside in the interests of public safety. After all, some action must be taken to prevent further tragedies of this nature, and current gun laws obviously have not achieved the desired success. This view may sound reasonable, but in reality it is simplistic and ignores vital aspects of the situation.
In fact, laws restricting citizens' ability to carry guns create an environment ripe for exactly the kind of tragedy that occurred in Colorado. Rather than being an argument for further gun control, the shooting is an indictment of current gun control laws. The theater in which the shooting occurred, owned by Cinemark Century Theaters, was officially a gun-free zone, as are all of Cinemark's theaters. The mall in Oregon was, like most malls across the country, a gun free zone and, obviously, Sandy Hook Elementary School was a gun free zone, as are most schools and universities. With these shootings more than 75% of mass public shootings since 1999, have occurred in gun free zones. That includes 77% of fatalities since 1999 and 83% of all those shot in mass public shootings since 1999. Far from filling their intended purpose as a safe area where students and others could pursue their lives free from the threat of gun violence, gun-free zones make an appealing target for lunatics across the country. This provides strong support for gun rights advocates' contention that more guns means less crime.
Many respond by pointing to the fact that America has the highest rate of gun ownership of any nation on earth and has very high rates of gun related homicides (in the top ten worldwide). They argue that the link is clear: Americans have more guns, therefore Americans commit more crimes. The reality is far more complex. Although it is true that America does have higher rates of gun related homicide, it also has higher rates of homicides completely unrelated to firearm use. Americans simply commit more murders (which is partially a result of the fact that the United States groups both criminal homicides and justifiable homicides, creating an inflated number). Further, Switzerland, which requires gun ownership for all adult males and has the highest rate of firearm ownership of any developed country besides the United States, has one of the lowest rates of gun related crime and has the fourth lowest homicide rate overall. Obviously the presence or absence of guns is not the primary indicator of homicide rates (or indeed of the rate of occurrence of any crime except, possibly, sexual assault).
This fact is seen in the lack of a statistical connection between a population's ability to own guns and low rates of gun crimes. According to the United Nations Office on Gun and Crimes (2000), the top five developed countries in per capita rates of homicides are, in order of decreasing homicide rates, Estonia, Belarus, Ukraine, Barbados, and Poland. Of these Estonia, Belarus, and Barbados prohibit gun ownership entirely while Ukraine and Poland allow regulated gun ownership. No correlation is apparent in this data, a trait shared by the five countries with lowest total homicide rate. These, Hong Kong, Singapore, Switzerland, Denmark, and Ireland, are also split, with Hong Kong and Singapore prohibiting all guns and the rest allowing (Switzerland even requires) gun ownership. Further, the top five developed countries in homicide rate with firearms is similarly divided. This group, again listed in descending order of homicides, is composed of Belarus, Barbados, the United States, Slovakia, and Estonia. Belarus, Barbados, and Estonia prohibit gun ownership while the United States and Slovakia do not. Similarly, the five developed countries with the lowest rates of homicide with firearms, Hong Kong, Singapore, England and Wales, New Zealand, and Spain, are equally split, with Hong Kong and Singapore prohibiting gun ownership entirely and England and Wales, New Zealand, and Spain allowing regulated gun ownership. The same statistical trend, or more accurately, lack of a statistical trend, occurs in all other lists of homicide rates by country. This fact is telling. Not only is total homicide rate independent of the legality or illegality of firearms, the rate of homicides committed with firearms isn't even dependent on the legality or illegality of firearms. In some cases banning guns may decrease the rate of homicides with firearms and thus the total homicide rate, in others it may not. Obviously other factors besides guns are far more important here.
Less drastic attempts to limit gun ownership, for example, banning certain types of firearms, has shown itself, at best, no more effective than banning guns entirely: that is, not at all effective. In 1982 Chicago instituted a policy banning handguns outright in the city. That year approximately 45% of homicides in the city were committed with handguns. Since that time the overall murder rate in Chicago has averaged 17% lower. Unfortunately for proponents of gun control, the nationwide murder rate has averaged 25% lower and the percentage of homicides committed with handguns has risen steadily since the ban until in 2008 96% of homicides in Chicago were committed with handguns. It is patently obvious that the ban didn't work at all as intended.
Many respond by pointing to the fact that America has the highest rate of gun ownership of any nation on earth and has very high rates of gun related homicides (in the top ten worldwide). They argue that the link is clear: Americans have more guns, therefore Americans commit more crimes. The reality is far more complex. Although it is true that America does have higher rates of gun related homicide, it also has higher rates of homicides completely unrelated to firearm use. Americans simply commit more murders (which is partially a result of the fact that the United States groups both criminal homicides and justifiable homicides, creating an inflated number). Further, Switzerland, which requires gun ownership for all adult males and has the highest rate of firearm ownership of any developed country besides the United States, has one of the lowest rates of gun related crime and has the fourth lowest homicide rate overall. Obviously the presence or absence of guns is not the primary indicator of homicide rates (or indeed of the rate of occurrence of any crime except, possibly, sexual assault).
This fact is seen in the lack of a statistical connection between a population's ability to own guns and low rates of gun crimes. According to the United Nations Office on Gun and Crimes (2000), the top five developed countries in per capita rates of homicides are, in order of decreasing homicide rates, Estonia, Belarus, Ukraine, Barbados, and Poland. Of these Estonia, Belarus, and Barbados prohibit gun ownership entirely while Ukraine and Poland allow regulated gun ownership. No correlation is apparent in this data, a trait shared by the five countries with lowest total homicide rate. These, Hong Kong, Singapore, Switzerland, Denmark, and Ireland, are also split, with Hong Kong and Singapore prohibiting all guns and the rest allowing (Switzerland even requires) gun ownership. Further, the top five developed countries in homicide rate with firearms is similarly divided. This group, again listed in descending order of homicides, is composed of Belarus, Barbados, the United States, Slovakia, and Estonia. Belarus, Barbados, and Estonia prohibit gun ownership while the United States and Slovakia do not. Similarly, the five developed countries with the lowest rates of homicide with firearms, Hong Kong, Singapore, England and Wales, New Zealand, and Spain, are equally split, with Hong Kong and Singapore prohibiting gun ownership entirely and England and Wales, New Zealand, and Spain allowing regulated gun ownership. The same statistical trend, or more accurately, lack of a statistical trend, occurs in all other lists of homicide rates by country. This fact is telling. Not only is total homicide rate independent of the legality or illegality of firearms, the rate of homicides committed with firearms isn't even dependent on the legality or illegality of firearms. In some cases banning guns may decrease the rate of homicides with firearms and thus the total homicide rate, in others it may not. Obviously other factors besides guns are far more important here.
Less drastic attempts to limit gun ownership, for example, banning certain types of firearms, has shown itself, at best, no more effective than banning guns entirely: that is, not at all effective. In 1982 Chicago instituted a policy banning handguns outright in the city. That year approximately 45% of homicides in the city were committed with handguns. Since that time the overall murder rate in Chicago has averaged 17% lower. Unfortunately for proponents of gun control, the nationwide murder rate has averaged 25% lower and the percentage of homicides committed with handguns has risen steadily since the ban until in 2008 96% of homicides in Chicago were committed with handguns. It is patently obvious that the ban didn't work at all as intended.
It is possible, however, that Chicago was simply an example of poor enforcement. Britain also instituted a crackdown on guns in 1968 and 1997. The 1968 law required anyone purchasing any firearm to obtain a certificate from their district police chief. Obtaining this certificate involved the payment of a fee and convincing the district police chief that they had a good reason for purchasing a firearm, and were not a threat to society. The 1968 law also required that the certificates specify the identification number of the firearm. In 1997 Britain passed a law banning handguns, and, using the identification numbers provided by the 1968 law, confiscated almost every gun in the country. Since the passage of the 1968 law the homicide rate has averaged 52% higher, while since the passage of the 1997 law the homicide rate has averaged 15% higher.
Britain's stunning lack of success was matched, however, by a similar utter failure in the United States. A law banning handguns in Washington D.C. was passed in 1976. After the passage of this law the homicide rate in Washington D.C. average 72% higher than previously. The law was struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2008 and homicide rates appear to be returning to pre-1976 levels. In short, laws restricting the sale, ownership, or use of firearms appear to, at best, merely maintain existing homicide rates. At worst they can have a severely negative effect on homicide rates.
Even the few cases cited as successes by advocates of gun control are hardly appealing. Australia has been mentioned in several articles on the subject as an excellent example of the positive effects of gun control. In 1996, in the wake of a tragic mass public shooting, Australia enacted a buyback program together with extensive regulations which guns are legal and which are not. Supporters of the legislation proudly point to the fact that no mass public shootings have occurred since that time, along with a slight decrease in overall gun violence, as evidence that the legislation worked. They ignore several troubling facts, however. Since the passage of the 1996 law 87% of gun crimes have been committed with illegal firearms. As opponents of gun control have argued, criminals will still find a way to get guns, if perhaps still in lower numbers. The other side of the story is unequivocally negative. The overall crime rate rose dramatically. Australia is now third in per capita rapes and sexual assaults and second among developed countries. The only developed country ahead of it in that category is South Africa, which also has quite restrictive gun control laws. The phenomenon is not limited to Australia and South Africa. Throughout the world rates of rape and sexual assault tend to rise when gun ownership is limited. Take, for example, U.S. college campuses, which are typically gun-free zones. Several studies estimate that as many as one in four female college students have been sexually assaulted.The negative effects of gun control on violent crime as a whole are abundantly evident in Mexico, where gun laws have historically been far more restrictive than those in the United States yet homicide rates are almost three times higher than in its northern neighbor.
One could list other examples, but the point has been made: at best, gun control maintains the status quo in crime rates. In a worst case scenario it can dramatically influence crime rates upwards. The inevitable conclusion is that an armed populace provides a significant deterrent to those who might desire to commit crime. Rather than providing a pool of armed criminals, arming the populace decreases the number of potential targets for criminals. However well-meaning attempts to limit or prohibit gun ownership may be, they are woefully misguided and potentially dangerous.
Sources:
- Agresti, James D. and Reid K. Smith. "Gun Control Facts" Just Facts, September 13, 2010. Revised 12/10/12. http://justfacts.com/guncontrol.asp
- “Murders (per capita; most recent) by country,” NationMaster.com, accessed July 17, 2012, http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/cri_mur_percap-crime-murders-per-capita
- “Rapes (per capita; most recent) by country,” NationMaster.com, accessed July 10, 2012, http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/cri_rap_percap-crime-rapes-per-capita
- “Murders with firearms (most recent) by country,” NationMaster.com, accessed July 22, 2012, http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/cri_mur_wit_fir-crime-murders-with-firearms
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