Veni Quid Veniat

     The Supreme Court's decision wasn't the first salvo on the topic of abortion. Efforts to relax state laws prohibiting abortion to include exceptions for rape, incest, the life of the mother, and other extreme cases through legislative means had been going on for years. No one, though, had argued that abortion was a constitutionally protected right. Justice Blackmun, together with his liberal colleagues, argued that a right to privacy existed in the Constitution, based either in the fourteenth or the ninth amendment, and that that right to privacy justified aborting unborn children up until the child would be viable if delivered. The decision led to more than fifty-two million abortions in the subsequent years—for comparison, total American deaths in World War II only come out to about one million.

     The decision in Roe v. Wade is troubling for a number of issues, some of them not even related to abortion. First, the court found a right to privacy in the Constitution not recognized by any scholar of that document. Certainly the Supreme Court, beginning in 1923, had actively reinterpreted the Constitution to extend the right to liberty found in the fourteenth amendment into a general right to privacy, but the 1973 decision expanded that effort massively. Chief Justice Douglas in Griswold v. Connecticut had found a right to privacy in the “emanations” and “penumbras” of other rights actually found in the Constitution. The district court that ruled in Roe v. Wade prior to the Supreme Court found that the right to privacy was derived from the ninth amendment. Justice Blackmun, in writing his opinion in Roe v. Wade expanded that right to privacy drastically and gave it a home in the fourteenth amendment.

     Each possible source of a constitutional right to privacy, however, lacks substance. The argument from “emanations” and “penumbras” is a fairly obvious attempt to read something into the Constitution the founders' did not intend. The argument from the ninth amendment is also badly off the mark. The Constitution is a limit on national, not state, government. The fact that the Constitution does not “deny or disparage” rights not specifically protected does not in any way mean that the states cannot do so. If one were to make the argument that the ninth amendment limits the states no state could pass any law that limits the rights of any individual in any way, since all rights would be protected by the ninth amendment. This is obviously absurd. The argument from the fourteenth amendment is also flawed. Although the fourteenth amendment guarantees that no state can deprive any citizen of “life, liberty, or property without due process of law,” the wording clearly intends “life, liberty, or property” to mean the three forms of punishment possible: death, imprisonment, or fine. Once again, by making the argument that liberty is intended to apply to all forms of liberty one reaches an entirely untenable conclusion.

     A greater flaw in the decision's reasoning lies in the age when the unborn child begins to be partially protected. According to the decision states cannot limit abortion in any way except to protect the life of the mother until the baby would be viable if delivered. The obvious implication is that life begins at viability. This lacks even basic common sense. While the decision, based on the ability of the medical community at that time, placed the line when viability began at twenty-eight weeks today fifty to seventy percent of babies born at twenty-four weeks survive. Even at twenty-three weeks thirty-five percent survive. Basing one's definition of what life should be protected on the viability of the child outside the womb thus places life entirely at the hands of technology. Fifty years ago keeping a child born at twenty-three weeks gestation alive would have been unimaginable. Today, although difficult, it is possible. One can imagine that similar advances will occur in the next fifty years, meaning that children who, according to Roe v. Wade, could not be protected by state law now would present little problem to the medical professionals of that time. To emphasis the absurdity of viability as a measure of the beginning of protected life a thought experiment could be useful. Imagine that a device capable of maintaining fetal viability beginning at fifteen weeks gestation was invented. The inventor, being a particularly greedy fellow, refused to reveal the plans or how the complex machine could be used before he was paid. Without a demonstration no company would pay for the eccentric genius's machine, so he died without revealing the secret of his invention. Now, are the unborn children at fifteen, sixteen, seventeen, etc. weeks gestation alive in such a way that they should be protected? Should they be allowed to be protected by state law? After all, the equipment does exist to keep them alive outside the womb. On the other hand, no one is capable of actually using the equipment, so perhaps they shouldn't be protected. One could go on and imagine any number of situations in which fetal viability would be completely inadequate to mark the beginning of life.

     This example, along with other objections to fetal viability as a measure of the beginning of protected life, merely highlights the problem: fetal viability has absolutely no relation to life. Arguing that an unborn child is not alive because it would not be viable outside the womb is exactly equivalent to arguing that you are not alive because you would not be viable if a maniac slammed an icepick through your head. One's future or potential state cannot, by definition, affect one's present state.

     A simple rule of thumb is that if something is not considered to be characteristic of human life in adult humans it should not be considered to be the single mark of life in the unborn. That means that, since future and potential viability are not considered to be marks of humanity in the population at large, they should not be considered such in the unborn. Further, no one seriously believes that the ability to feel pain, cognizance, appearance, or the size of one's brain or other organs marks human life in the population at large, so it should not be the mark of life in the unborn. In reality, the one physical trait that is universally considered to mark a human being is the presence of a unique set of DNA. One cannot point to any other stage in the development of an unborn human when anything intrinsic to the nature of the child changes dramatically enough to warrant being considered to be the beginning of life.

     Given that life logically must begin at conception, when all the information necessary for life is present, society, through government, has not only the right but also the duty to protect that right. First and foremost among government's tasks is the duty to protect life and implicit in that duty is the necessity of first defining life by the best means possible. Thus abortion is not, as many would have us believe, a private, personal choice beyond the reach of government intervention, it is, as we have seen, an attack on the most defenseless among us and as such is well within the purview of government. Even liberal Justice Blackmun admitted that if the unborn baby was a person it would “of course” be protected by the fourteenth amendment. This means that the unborn are protected by the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws, and Congress is authorized to pass appropriate legislation to enforce that protection. It is past high time that Congress and the American people shake off the Supreme Court's deadly foolishness by taking appropriate action to protect the rights of every person within the United States, born or unborn.

     In fact, laws restricting citizens' ability to carry guns create an environment ripe for exactly the kind of tragedy that occurred in Colorado. Rather than being an argument for further gun control, the shooting is an indictment of current gun control laws. The theater in which the shooting occurred, owned by Cinemark Century Theaters, was officially a gun-free zone, as are all of Cinemark's theaters. The mall in Oregon was, like most malls across the country, a gun free zone and, obviously, Sandy Hook Elementary School was a gun free zone, as are most schools and universities. With these shootings more than 75% of mass public shootings since 1999, have occurred in gun free zones. That includes 77% of fatalities since 1999 and 83% of all those shot in mass public shootings since 1999. Far from filling their intended purpose as a safe area where students and others could pursue their lives free from the threat of gun violence, gun-free zones make an appealing target for lunatics across the country. This provides strong support for gun rights advocates' contention that more guns means less crime.

     Many respond by pointing to the fact that America has the highest rate of gun ownership of any nation on earth and has very high rates of gun related homicides (in the top ten worldwide). They argue that the link is clear: Americans have more guns, therefore Americans commit more crimes. The reality is far more complex. Although it is true that America does have higher rates of gun related homicide, it also has higher rates of homicides completely unrelated to firearm use. Americans simply commit more murders (which is partially a result of the fact that the United States groups both criminal homicides and justifiable homicides, creating an inflated number). Further, Switzerland, which requires gun ownership for all adult males and has the highest rate of firearm ownership of any developed country besides the United States, has one of the lowest rates of gun related crime and has the fourth lowest homicide rate overall. Obviously the presence or absence of guns is not the primary indicator of homicide rates (or indeed of the rate of occurrence of any crime except, possibly, sexual assault).

     This fact is seen in the lack of a statistical connection between a population's ability to own guns and low rates of gun crimes. According to the United Nations Office on Gun and Crimes (2000), the top five developed countries in per capita rates of homicides are, in order of decreasing homicide rates, Estonia, Belarus, Ukraine, Barbados, and Poland. Of these Estonia, Belarus, and Barbados prohibit gun ownership entirely while Ukraine and Poland allow regulated gun ownership. No correlation is apparent in this data, a trait shared by the five countries with lowest total homicide rate. These, Hong Kong, Singapore, Switzerland, Denmark, and Ireland, are also split, with Hong Kong and Singapore prohibiting all guns and the rest allowing (Switzerland even requires) gun ownership. Further, the top five developed countries in homicide rate with firearms is similarly divided. This group, again listed in descending order of homicides, is composed of Belarus, Barbados, the United States, Slovakia, and Estonia. Belarus, Barbados, and Estonia prohibit gun ownership while the United States and Slovakia do not. Similarly, the five developed countries with the lowest rates of homicide with firearms, Hong Kong, Singapore, England and Wales, New Zealand, and Spain, are equally split, with Hong Kong and Singapore prohibiting gun ownership entirely and England and Wales, New Zealand, and Spain allowing regulated gun ownership. The same statistical trend, or more accurately, lack of a statistical trend, occurs in all other lists of homicide rates by country. This fact is telling. Not only is total homicide rate independent of the legality or illegality of firearms, the rate of homicides committed with firearms isn't even dependent on the legality or illegality of firearms. In some cases banning guns may decrease the rate of homicides with firearms and thus the total homicide rate, in others it may not. Obviously other factors besides guns are far more important here.

     Less drastic attempts to limit gun ownership, for example, banning certain types of firearms, has shown itself, at best, no more effective than banning guns entirely: that is, not at all effective. In 1982 Chicago instituted a policy banning handguns outright in the city. That year approximately 45% of homicides in the city were committed with handguns. Since that time the overall murder rate in Chicago has averaged 17% lower. Unfortunately for proponents of gun control, the nationwide murder rate has averaged 25% lower and the percentage of homicides committed with handguns has risen steadily since the ban until in 2008 96% of homicides in Chicago were committed with handguns. It is patently obvious that the ban didn't work at all as intended.

     It is possible, however, that Chicago was simply an example of poor enforcement. Britain also instituted a crackdown on guns in 1968 and 1997. The 1968 law required anyone purchasing any firearm to obtain a certificate from their district police chief. Obtaining this certificate involved the payment of a fee and convincing the district police chief that they had a good reason for purchasing a firearm, and were not a threat to society. The 1968 law also required that the certificates specify the identification number of the firearm. In 1997 Britain passed a law banning handguns, and, using the identification numbers provided by the 1968 law, confiscated almost every gun in the country. Since the passage of the 1968 law the homicide rate has averaged 52% higher, while since the passage of the 1997 law the homicide rate has averaged 15% higher.

     Britain's stunning lack of success was matched, however, by a similar utter failure in the United States. A law banning handguns in Washington D.C. was passed in 1976. After the passage of this law the homicide rate in Washington D.C. average 72% higher than previously. The law was struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2008 and homicide rates appear to be returning to pre-1976 levels. In short, laws restricting the sale, ownership, or use of firearms appear to, at best, merely maintain existing homicide rates. At worst they can have a severely negative effect on homicide rates.

     Even the few cases cited as successes by advocates of gun control are hardly appealing. Australia has been mentioned in several articles on the subject as an excellent example of the positive effects of gun control. In 1996, in the wake of a tragic mass public shooting, Australia enacted a buyback program together with extensive regulations which guns are legal and which are not. Supporters of the legislation proudly point to the fact that no mass public shootings have occurred since that time, along with a slight decrease in overall gun violence, as evidence that the legislation worked. They ignore several troubling facts, however. Since the passage of the 1996 law 87% of gun crimes have been committed with illegal firearms. As opponents of gun control have argued, criminals will still find a way to get guns, if perhaps still in lower numbers. The other side of the story is unequivocally negative. The overall crime rate rose dramatically. Australia is now third in per capita rapes and sexual assaults and second among developed countries. The only developed country ahead of it in that category is South Africa, which also has quite restrictive gun control laws. The phenomenon is not limited to Australia and South Africa. Throughout the world rates of rape and sexual assault tend to rise when gun ownership is limited. Take, for example, U.S. college campuses, which are typically gun-free zones. Several studies estimate that as many as one in four female college students have been sexually assaulted.The negative effects of gun control on violent crime as a whole are abundantly evident in Mexico, where gun laws have historically been far more restrictive than those in the United States yet homicide rates are almost three times higher than in its northern neighbor.

     One could list other examples, but the point has been made: at best, gun control maintains the status quo in crime rates. In a worst case scenario it can dramatically influence crime rates upwards. The inevitable conclusion is that an armed populace provides a significant deterrent to those who might desire to commit crime. Rather than providing a pool of armed criminals, arming the populace decreases the number of potential targets for criminals. However well-meaning attempts to limit or prohibit gun ownership may be, they are woefully misguided and potentially dangerous.