Veni Quid Veniat

          It is in the Senate that the story first becomes noteworthy. So far, it has been business as usual in government, but things really get exciting in the Senate. The Senate, with a Democrat majority (fifty-two Democrats, two Democrat-leaning independents, and forty-six Republicans), could usually be expected to vote against a CR which did not provide funding for Obamacare. For Republicans, the solution to the roadblock the Democrat-controlled Senate provided could be found in the fact that the Constitution only allows for one house of Congress, the House of Representatives, to propose spending bills. If Senate Republicans could prevent the House’s CR from being amended, they could force Senate Democrats to choose between the House’s CR and nothing at all. With six Democrat senators from Republican states, and seven from swing states, up for reelection in 2014, standing by an unpopular program in the face of a government shutdown could prove a very unappealing prospect for all but the most liberal Democrats. More important, since amending a bill typically requires sixty votes, and since Democrats and liberal independents together only fielded fifty-four votes, Republicans could force a straight up or down vote on the CR. Had that happened, it is more than likely that government, with the exception of Obamacare, would be fully funded today. What happened instead, however, was a remarkable display of hypocrisy from twenty-five Republican senators.
          Harry Reid is no idiot. He saw the Republican plan shaping up, and promptly acted to counteract it. He did so by filing a motion for cloture. Usually used to end debates, cloture sets limits on what amendments can be proposed and what debate can take place on a bill. More important in this context, it sets a new bar for amending bills: insteading of requiring sixty votes, amendments would now only need a simple majority, fifty-one votes, to pass. The Democrats had fifty-one votes; if cloture was invoked on the bill they could amend it essentially at will. Of course, cloture itself required sixty votes to pass, but Reid assumed that a significant number of Republican senators were in fact hypocrites, who spoke against Obamacare but didn’t actually want to take action to stop it. These senators, presented with cover to vote for Obamacare while voting against the amendment to fund it (confident that they would fail to defund it because of their earlier vote for cloture), would then vote for cloture, Obamacare would be funded, and the pressure would be placed on the House to vote for the Senate’s CR or be blamed for the shutdown (if one studies it long enough, one will realize that the entire episode was a massive game of “hot potato” with budget bills).

          Harry Reid’s response was nearly undefeatable. The only chance conservatives had - and it was a desperate hope - was to bring enough attention to the ploy that the Republican senators who hoped to vote for Obamacare while posturing against it would be flushed out by their constituents. To that end, Ted Cruz took the floor on Tuesday afternoon, and held it until midday Wednesday, twenty-one hours later, speaking against voting for cloture on the CR (not, as has been erroneously reported, against voting for cloture on the motion to proceed on the CR). His stand provoked enormous support among the Republican base, and a symmetric backlash against those Republican senators who were contemplating voting for cloture. The effort was unsuccessful, however, and cloture passed seventy-nine to nineteen. Twenty-five Republican senators chose to allow Obamacare to be funded, among them Cruz’s colleague from Texas, John Cornyn. Reid promptly proposed an amendment to the CR to fund Obamacare, the amendment passed in a party-line vote, and the CR passed in a party-line vote. That was all a formality; once Republicans voted for cloture on the bill it was all over but the shouting.

Of Compromise and Chaos

          With Senate Republicans' capitulation, the CR returned to the House. There House Republicans, led by Speaker of the House John Boehner, proposed an amendment which, although less forceful than the original wording of the CR, delayed and reformed Obamacare. Now, so far, this has been business as usual in Washington, although the CR's passage through the Senate was a bit more exciting than usual. At this point, when the House and the Senate have passed different versions of a bill, the bill goes through a process called "reconciliation." Both houses pass compromise measures, trading the bill between them, until a solution is reached which, although imperfect, is at least amenable to both houses. Occasionally leadership in one house or the other will see fit to refuse to take part in the process, but that is rare. Unfortunately, that is also exactly what Harry Reid chose to do. Instead of following normal procedures and amending the bill with a compromise solution, Reid held a straight up or down vote on the new compromise CR. It was voted down along party lines. In response, the House passed a third version of the CR, which moved even closer to the Senate's position. Again the Senate voted it down on a party line vote, and again the Senate proposed no compromise measure. The House passed yet another compromise, and again the Senate voted it down along party lines. That was the afternoon of the last day nonessential functions of government were funded, and that night at midnight the government shut down. The next day Republicans passed still another compromise CR, with the same predictable results in the Senate. Democrats reiterated that they would not take part in negotiating or reconciling the House and Senate versions of the bill. In essence, they issued an ultimatum to the House: fund government as we decide you will, or fund none at all.
          The House rejected the ultimatum. House Republicans, grounded in a firm understanding of the history of funding fights in British and American politics (a history which begins in the 1600s and which was the catalyst which eventually led to rule by the people, not by a king), refused to back down. Instead, they offered to set aside the debate over funding Obamacare for the moment and pass smaller CRs which funded individual parts of government. Once government was funded and the shutdown ended, the Democrats could, if they wished, try to pass a CR to fund Obamacare. Of course, Democrats recognized that the no CR to fund Obamacare alone could ever pass both houses (one could argue that it would have a bit of difficulty passing just the Senate, if things broke the wrong way for Democrats). Ending the shutdown and then resuming the debate over funding Obamacare was not an option for Democrats. They set out to block every CR House Republicans proposed, blocking CRs funding, variously: disability payments for veterans, pay for the National Guard, funds for national parks and monuments, the National Institutes of Health (a debate which led to Reid's infamous "why would we want to do that?" comment in response to a question about saving a child's life by funding the NIH), FEMA, and assorted other programs.
          None of this, however, has stopped Democrats from blaming Republicans for the shutdown. Despite Republican protestations and despite the fact that it was Democrats who first deviated from the normal process of passing legislation by refusing to negotiate, the public appears to agree with them (at least that portion of the public which does not pay attention to politics - more on that below). The Obama administration, taking advantage of the fact that Republicans are currently blamed for the shutdown by a plurality of Americans, instructed National Park Service employees, as well as other government employees, to make the shutdown as painful as possible. Open-air monuments, which had never previously been closed in a shutdown, were shut down, to the point where attempts were made to block views to Mount Rushmore. Government websites considered nonessential, such as the USGS seismic map site, were shut down, despite the fact that shutting them down actually required more time and effort than leaving them up. Throughout the shutdown, both parties remain obviously, painfully conscious of the fact that the American people will be voting in 2014.

To 2014 and Beyond: what about the Elections?

          Speaking of the elections in 2014, it is worth considering what will happen in 2014. Democrats have, of course, as part of their strategy been claiming that it will lead to a certain repeat of the Republican disaster following the last government shutdown, in 1996. Republicans would far rather it paralleled the 2010 elections. With that in mind, we will compare the outcome of both the '96 and the '10 elections, and reach a conclusion about what might happen in 2014 (bearing in mind that it is dangerous to make predictions, especially about the future).
          In 1996, at the top of the ticket, Bob Dole faced off against Bill Clinton. Clinton was at the height of his power: smooth, suave, and, as always, the consummate politician. Dole was none of those things, and that's putting it nicely. With or without the shutdown, Dole never had a chance. That raises the interesting problem for Republicans that a party that loses to an incumbent president tends to do very badly in the House and Senate as well. Ignoring the shutdown, Republicans would be doing well just to hold their own in the House and Senate. Surprisingly, given what most current media reports imply, Republicans did just that, and better. In the House, Republicans went from holding 230 seats to only 227, while Democrats went from 204 to 206 seats. A net loss overall, but Republicans maintained their majority. In the Senate, where each seat is more valuable because there are fewer of them, Republicans gained two seats to not only maintain their majority but make it a little bit safer.
          In 2010, the election which was most nearly a referendum on Obamacare, the outcome was much different. In the Senate, Republicans held every seat, took four seats held by retiring Democrats, and defeated two Democrat incumbents. The Senate went from fifty-seven Democrats, two Democrat-leaning independents (notably, Democrats could usually command three-fifths of the Senate, giving them almost unchecked power), and forty Republicans to fifty-one Democrats, two Democrat-leaning independents, and forty-seven Republicans. This was the largest Republican gain in the Senate since 1994 (and probably would have led to Republican control of the Senate in 2012 if the Republicans hadn't run a Bob Dole impersonator for president). In the House, before the election Democrats had a majority with 256 seats, while Republicans only had 179 seats. After the election, Republicans held the majority with 242 seats, and Democrats were reduced to 193 seats - the largest loss by any party since 1938. 

          We will assume that the worst case scenario for Republicans is that the 2014 elections paralleled the 1996 elections and Republicans did slightly better than breaking even. In that case, the best case scenario for Republicans is that the 2014 elections will parallel the 2010 elections. Of course, Republicans cannot expect a sixty-three seat gain, since many Democrat representatives are now entrenched in heavily Democrat districts, but if the 2014 election parallels 2010 some Republican gains in the House can be expected. It is in the Senate, however, that the comparison becomes most intriguing. In 2010 Republicans took ~31% of the Democrat seats up for grabs. Assuming the same rate in 2014 (and, incidentally, that is a very safe assumption, since six Democrats are retiring and, compared to 2010, more Democrat seats in red or swing states are up for grabs), Republicans would again gain six states, most likely from some combination of Montana, South Dakota, North Carolina, West Virginia, Arkansas, Louisiana, Alaska, Iowa, Virginia, and Colorado. A gain of six seats would give Republicans a fifty-two to forty-eight advantage.
          In other words, considering only the effects of the shutdown, the worst case scenario for Republicans is holding steady in the House and Senate, and the best case scenario is controlling both houses. Of course, such an analysis must be woefully incomplete without considering other factors, but since speculation is rampant about the effect the shutdown will have on the 2014 elections (including a very poorly worded poll, which essentially states that Republicans are completely responsible for the shutdown and then asks how people would vote - one could readily imagine how such a poll could be more than a little biased), it is worth mentioning.

           In contrast to what is often reported, the actual facts of the matter show conclusively that the shutdown is a result of action taken by the Democrats in refusing to participate in the normal process of governing. Republicans in the House, acting within the authority given them by the Constitution and the mandate given them by their constituents (the largest gain by any party since 1938 in the 2010 elections was largely fueled by opposition to Obamacare), proposed a spending plan which did not fund Obamacare. Democrats responded by acting as if Republicans had done something completely unheard of, and refused to vote to fund government if Obamacare was not funded. Not content with simply shutting down government, Democrats also set out to misinform the public about the reason for the shutdown. Fortunately for those who value truth, history shows that Republicans will likely achieve significant gains in the 2014 election, and may even take control of both houses of Congress. Much more could - and should - be said about the shutdown, but hopefully this essay has covered the basic concepts.